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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between privacy, technology, and law is complex. Thomas 
Jefferson’s prescient nineteenth century observation that laws and institutions must keep 
pace with the times offers a vision for change. Statutory law and court precedents help to 
define our right to privacy, however, the development of new technologies has 
complicated the application of old precedents and statutes. Third party organizations, 
such as Google, facilitate new methods of communication, and the government can often 
collect the information that third parties receive with a subpoena or court order, rather 
than a Fourth Amendment-mandated warrant. Privacy promotes fundamental democratic 
freedoms, however, under current law, the digital age has diminished the right to privacy 
in our electronic communications data. 
This work explores the statutory and constitutional law protecting our right to 
privacy, as well as the inadequacies that have developed with the digital revolution. With 
commonplace use of third parties to facilitate electronic communication, our courts and 
lawmakers must amend current laws and doctrines to protect the privacy of 
communications in the digital age. To provide clarity and appropriate data privacy 
protections, the following clarifications and amendments should be made to the third 
party doctrine and the Stored Communications Act (SCA): 1) third party doctrine should 
only apply to context data, 2) content data should be protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
3) the SCA should eliminate the distinction between Remote Computing Services (RCS) 
and Electronic Communication Services (ECS) communications, and 4) the SCA should 
require warrants for all content data acquisition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1816, Thomas Jefferson avowed: 
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new 
discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions 
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, 
and keep pace with the times.1 
 
Two centuries later, smartphones have become a commonplace means of internet access, 
tablets have begun to replace printed books, and the expansion of the internet has allowed 
us to access nearly any service or good with the touch of a button. Digital technology is 
fully integrated in our everyday lives as a means of communication, education, and 
services. The digital revolution, however, has presented several challenges for our laws 
and institutions to “keep pace with the times” in the balance between the Framers’ 
notions of privacy and technological development. 
Today, over 75% of Americans own a personal computer and use the internet.2 
With this development, the interaction between law, privacy, and technology has become 
more complicated. The Framers created the Fourth Amendment in response to writs of 
assistance allowing British guards to search through homes and possessions of American 
colonists.3 However, the nature of the Fourth Amendment and the statutory protections 
for individual privacy has significantly changed with technological advancement, and our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Susan Clair Imbarrato, Declarations of Independency in Eighteenth Century 
2 Thom File, “Computer and Internet Use in the United States,” U.S. Department of 
Commerce: Economics and Statistics Administration, May 2013, accessed April 12, 
2014, http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf. 
3 Stephen J. Schulhofer, More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the 
Twenty-First Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 3. 
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right to privacy has grown increasingly vague. Have our laws and institutions 
appropriately kept up with “the times” as Jefferson believed they should? 
The National Security Agency’s use of surveillance in the U.S. is perhaps one of 
the most pertinent examples of the relationship between the law, privacy, and technology 
in recent history. Alarmed with the U.S. government’s invasion of citizen privacy, many 
citizens called on the Supreme Court to strike down the NSA’s surveillance program 
under the Fourth Amendment. Others, however, articulated the balance required between 
individual liberties and national security, arguing in favor of surveillance programs. The 
rift between privacy and the law in the U.S. has been apparent since the beginning of our 
government and the Framers’ desire to protect against unwarranted home searches. 
However, the rapid development of technology introduces a new weight to balance in the 
relationship between privacy and law. Is it reasonable to believe that our email messages 
or the movies we stream online will remain private information? The issue of privacy, 
technology, and the law has become quickly complicated in the past decade with the 
development of the internet. With ever-developing technological advancements, how do 
we ensure a reasonable degree of privacy in our communications? Furthermore, should 
the courts or should Congress be given the reigns to determine the future of our privacy?  
A study completed by Pew Research Center’s Internet Project and Carnegie 
Mellon University examined the degree of privacy that internet users expect.4 Several key 
statistics from the Pew Center study illustrate the issue of privacy online and public 
perception of the protections guaranteed to citizens to protect privacy: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lee Rainie, Sara Kiesler, Ruogu Kang, and Mary Madden, “Anonymity, Privacy, and 
Security Online,” Pew Research Internet Project, September 5, 2013, accessed April 14, 
2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/. 
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• 68% of internet users think that the U.S. needs better laws to protect 
online privacy. 
• 24% of users think that statutory protections are suitable to current 
technology and privacy demands. 
• 37% of users believe that it is possible to be anonymous online. 
• 86% of users have attempted to increase their anonymity online by 
clearing cookies, using fake email addresses, or another means of 
decreased visibility. 
• 55% of users have attempted to avoid information gathering by specific 
entities, such as the government or a company.5 
 
Privacy in online and electronic communications has become an increasingly salient issue 
in the past decade, and many Americans are concerned with the amount of legal 
protection afforded to technological privacy.  
Privacy allows an individual to control the information that he or she wants to 
reveal to others. Whether incriminating evidence to a robbery, medical information, or 
simply a picture of your mother stored on your cell phone, many individuals seek to 
protect personal information from public knowledge. Control over what can and cannot 
be revealed helps to protect against quick judgments, allowing an individual to present 
the version of his or herself that he or she desires.6 The right to privacy, however, is 
complicated. As case law, statutory law, and dozens of journal articles have expressed, 
there are various considerations in conceptualizing the degree of privacy protection 
guaranteed to citizens, and with the adoption of technology, personal privacy has become 
increasingly unclear. Whereas an individual would be prohibited from opening another’s 
letter sent in the mail from a friend, e-mail correspondence is much easier for unwelcome 
eyes to reach. Cell phones, computers, and other personal devices have become almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid. 
6 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, (New 
York: Random House, 2000), 11. 
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second nature to many; however, the degree of privacy in communications is much less 
robust than before the digital revolution. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures of 
homes and of personal information. However, the U.S. Constitution does not expressly 
guarantee the right to privacy. Although the Bill of Rights lacks an explicit declaration of 
privacy, many have understood privacy as an inherent guarantee as an American citizen. 
The definition and application of the right to privacy is unclear, particularly in regard to 
technology. Explaining the complexity of the right to privacy in the digital age, Professor 
Jeffery Rosen says: 
[i]n cyberspace the greatest threat to privacy comes not from nosy 
employers and neighbors but from the electronic footprints that make it 
possible to monitor and trace nearly everything we read, write, browse, 
and buy. Most Web browsers are configured to reveal to every Web site 
you visit the address of the page you visited most recently and your 
Internet Protocol address, which may—or may not—identify you as an 
individual user.7 
 
A vast amount of information is stored in each web page visited, telephone call received, 
and text message sent.8 These “footprints” enable governments, companies, and 
individuals to access information and data that would otherwise remain private. Very 
little legal fortification exists to protect our presumed private communications from 
government subpoena or other unwelcome eyes. 
Diminished privacy in light of technological advancement has been at issue since 
the very beginnings of technology’s development. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
and attorney Samuel Warren explored the interaction between emerging technology and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 163. 
8 Ibid., 164.  
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privacy during the development of the camera in 1890. The two lawyers issued “The 
Right to Privacy” after reading a newspaper’s discussion of a breakfast party that Warren 
hosted in celebration of his daughter’s wedding.9 Arguing in favor of a “general right of 
the individual to be let alone,” Warren and Brandeis acknowledged the effect of new 
technologies on privacy, stating: “numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good 
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”10 As the Justices recognized, technological advancement began to make it easier 
for the government, the press, and individuals to gain access to and to exploit information 
that they otherwise would not have obtained. However, the two men also understood that 
the right to keep information private “is lost only when the author himself communicates 
his production to the public, -- in other words, publishes it.”11 Various court cases have 
since attempted to establish where this line of “publishing” lies. However, with the 
introduction of technologies such as the internet and smart phones, this line is ambiguous, 
and personal privacy is left at risk.  
The Supreme Court began to outline the right to privacy in regard to emerging 
technologies in the 1960s. In Katz v. United States, Justice John Marshall Harlan issued a 
concurring opinion illuminating the reaches of the Fourth Amendment. Harlan introduced 
an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and explained that if someone 
presumes that an activity will be private and that this expectation is “reasonable,” then an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review IV, 
no. 5, (December 1890). 
11 Ibid. 
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intrusion should be prohibited.12 However, if an individual engages in an activity or 
conversation in the open, there is an understanding that the conversation or activity could 
be overheard, thus the individual does not have a reasonable expectation to privacy.13 In 
addition, Katz introduced the distinction between context and content information. While 
the specific content of communications, such as the text of a message, is private, the 
context information, such as the numbers called on a phone, does not retain an 
expectation to privacy.14 This distinction and what it means in the context of our right to 
privacy is further explored in Chapter 2, and it is later applied to the NSA’s data 
surveillance program in Chapter 4.  
The doctrine introduced by Justice Harlan in Katz is not easily applied to twenty-
first century technology. In weighing the issue, many courts have split on various ideas of 
privacy as it relates to technologies, including in two cases that the Supreme Court is set 
to hear in the 2014 docket addressing law enforcement’s ability to search the contents of 
a cell phone after an arrest, as well as several cases considering the constitutionality and 
legality of the NSA’s surveillance program. As controversy surrounds the topic of 
privacy and technology, it is a common concern whether we have a reasonable 
expectation to believe that our digital and electronic communications, such as personal e-
mail, text messages, and other information kept on phones and computers should be 
guaranteed privacy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), in Cornell University Law 
School Legal Information Institute, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347 (accessed February 18, 2014). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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In 1986, Congress attempted to advance protection in the digital age with the 
development of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The SCA was enacted in 
response to the emergence of new methods of communication and to govern 
circumstances in which government and other organizations can access communications 
information stored with third parties. Congress also passed the Wiretap Act to address the 
collection of data and to forbid “intercepting” data without a warrant.15 In enacting new 
protections, Congress argued: 
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of protection 
against unauthorized opening … [and] [v]oice communications 
transmitted via common carrier are protected … But there are no 
comparable Federal statutory standards to protect the privacy and security 
of communications transmitted by new noncommon carrier 
communications services or new forms of telecommunications and 
computer technology.16 
 
The SCA recognized the need for new laws to ensure communications privacy. However, 
the SCA was passed in 1986, and many of its provisions are no longer relevant to new 
devices. Since 1986, we have seen, for example, the development of the computer as a 
common household item and smart phones with the same computing ability as home 
computers. Furthermore, many services have entered the online realm, such as medical 
records, banking applications, and cloud storage of personal files. The SCA, although 
offering some protection, does not adequately protect new methods of communicating, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Orin S. Kerr, “Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law,” in Constitution 
3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, ed. Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes 
(Washington D.C.: 2011), 43. 
16 Quoted in Laura Arredondo-Santiteban, “Stealing Glances: Electronic 
Communications Privacy and the Necessity for New Legislation in the Digital Age,” 
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, Online Edition, (2013). 
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and many district courts have interpreted the act very narrowly, excluding protection of 
new devices with personal data storage.17 
Further complicating the privacy of electronic communications, both the SCA and 
the Supreme Court have acknowledged the “third party doctrine” in which individuals 
who reveal information to a third party cannot reasonably expect that information to 
remain private.18 In Miller v. United States, the Court determined that an individual 
“takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed 
by that person to the government...even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.”19 Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court has determined that 
communications conveyed to a third party, such as a phone company, internet service 
provider, or banking institution, are not guaranteed Fourth Amendment protection.20 
Based on the third party doctrine, the government can collect data from any company that 
collects or organizes personal data or transactions with a court order or subpoena, rather 
than probable cause and a warrant.21 Because much of our communication today takes 
place by way of a third party, the government can fairly easily obtain our information. 
With easier access to communications, some may begin to monitor their communications. 
Journalists, for example, may shy away from contacting controversial political groups out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid. 
18 Orin S. Kerr, “The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine,” Michigan Law Review 107, 
(2008): 561. 
19 Christopher Slobogin, “Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?” 
in Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, ed. Jeffrey Rosen and 
Benjamin Wittes (Washington D.C.: 2011), 17. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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of fear that the government will obtain the information and assume that it is being used 
for an illicit purpose. As demonstrated by the Pew Center’s research, many Americans 
are concerned with the amount of information collected by third parties, and thus 
increased data collection could endanger freedom of expression through the internet and 
other means of communication. 
Rulings in cases involving access to electronic communications information have 
been largely inconsistent among the courts, with various courts splitting decisions on 
similar cases. Technology has become an integral part of our lives in the past decade, 
however, with this adoption, our privacy has diminished and much of our information has 
become more public. Courts have limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment in regard 
to technology with the third party doctrine, and statutory law protects only certain aspects 
of communications. As the controversy of our data privacy grows, how will the right to 
privacy and the needs of national security be balanced? 
Chapter 1 of this work explains the value of privacy as we have viewed it in 
society. Warren and Brandeis were among the first scholars to address the issue, and 
many have assumed that American citizens are guaranteed privacy in personal matters. 
Courts and Congress have aptly outlined our privacy rights, and Chapter 1 provides an 
informational primer on Supreme Court cases and statutory law that has defined the 
guarantee to privacy. Chapter 2 addresses the third party doctrine and the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA). Each phone call made, website visited, or email sent is 
recorded and stored by third party companies as it travels to its destination. The Supreme 
Court established that once information is conveyed to a third party, the expectation to 
privacy in that information diminishes – and this complicates the right to privacy in our 
	   Moller 16 
communications in the digital age. To help guide access to third party communications 
information, Congress created the SCA, which provides specific protection to stored 
communications information. Both the third party doctrine and the SCA are controversial 
and do not strongly protect the right to privacy in electronic communications.  
Chapter 3 provides an evaluation of the NSA’s data surveillance program under 
the third party doctrine and illuminates its effects on the SCA. After specifics of the 
NSA’s secret program were revealed in 2013, many American citizens became greatly 
concerned with privacy in communications information. However, various statutes have 
complicated the application of the third party doctrine to the NSA’s data collection, and 
the future of the program remains unclear. Chapter 4 assesses the need for updated 
privacy protections in regard to both surveillance programs and to traditional information 
collection by law enforcement. The Fourth Amendment should protect the contents of our 
communications, just as the contents of a mailed letter are protected from unreasonable 
search and seizure. Current laws and third party jurisprudence allow access to content 
information with a subpoena or court order, which are much easier to obtain. Privacy in 
electronic communications has become an important issue for Americans, and both the 
SCA and the third party doctrine should be amended to more aptly address new methods 
of communication. Our right to privacy is at risk, and only if the courts and Congress 
update current protections will our information be protected.
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CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The Value of Privacy 
Privacy as we value it today is not as simple as the right to secrecy in personal 
matters. Rather, privacy exists as Warren and Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” and the 
“right to control” personal information in the public sphere.1 The two lawyers assert that 
individuals have the “right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”2 Although some matters of 
privacy are simpler, such as the right to privacy when using the restroom, the relationship 
between privacy and technology is complicated and ever-changing. Warren and 
Brandeis’ conception of privacy is not restricted to past technologies. Instead, Warren 
and Brandeis recognized the development of technology and illuminated fundamental, 
unchanging values of privacy to remain constant through technology’s development. 
However, the line between an invasion of privacy and access to information is muddled. 
Courts have struggled to define and apply privacy to technological advancement. With 
rapid technological change, it is important to more clearly articulate the right to privacy 
and its guarantees in relation to technology and data.   
Ten years after Warren and Brandies’ article was published, courts and 
legislatures began to outline the right to privacy by introducing invasions of privacy 
torts.3 Legislation had not yet truly addressed the issue of privacy, however, many court 
cases emerged to help define invasions of privacy. In the 1970s, tort law specialist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review IV, 
no. 5, (December 1890). 
2 Ibid.  
3 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, 
(New York: New York University Press, 2004), 59. 
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William Prosser completed a survey of privacy cases to determine the court’s conception 
of privacy law after Warren and Brandeis published “The Right to Privacy.”4 Prosser 
identified four divisions of privacy in tort law: “intrusion upon seclusion,” characterized 
as intrusion into one’s private affairs; “public disclosure of private facts,” explained as a 
tort oriented toward the press to protect against disclosure of a private matter; “false 
light” torts similar to libel and slander; and “appropriation” to use the name or likeness of 
another.5 Although these tort areas help to define the scope of privacy law, it is difficult 
to discern when, for instance, peering into an individual’s online information triggers an 
invasion of privacy. As explained by data privacy scholar Daniel Solove, it is especially 
difficult to pin down technological privacy in relation to the “information flows” that 
characterize much of today’s personal data activity.6 Tech and online matters often 
include a “multitude of actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each doing different 
things at different times,” which makes it difficult to define which actions are private and 
which are not.7 Courts have not clearly defined how to apply the law to dynamic online 
activities and applications.   
Some believe that the right to privacy can weaken public safety by inhibiting 
government from obtaining information about criminals.8 However, privacy is more 
complex than the criminal information collected by the government and police. Privacy 
encompasses e-mail accounts, bank statements, medical prescriptions, personal letters, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid, 59. 
5 Ibid, 59-60 
6 Ibid, 61-62. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stephen J. Schulhofer, More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the 
Twenty-First Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15.  
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conversations with others, and online activity. Although many are not in violation of the 
law and do not possess incriminating information against themselves or others, there is 
value in protecting conversations, religious beliefs, political views, and other personal 
information. It is unlikely that an individual would consent for someone to post all of 
their private records and information on the internet for others to view, and the right to 
privacy helps to guarantee control over personal information. Law professor Stephen 
Schulhofer explains privacy as “indispensable for the capacity to feel at peace, to try out 
new ideas, to think and grow as an independent individual.”9 The guarantee of privacy 
allows citizens to define their beliefs and ideas without fear of ridicule or comment from 
others. Lacking privacy, citizens may feel that they cannot exercise their political or 
religious beliefs without being ostracized by fellow citizens. 
Privacy protections are necessary to uphold essential principles of democracy and 
American values and freedoms. As Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor comments in 
United States v. Jones, “[a]wareness that the government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”10 The guarantee to privacy helps to maintain 
fundamental values, such as the right to associate and to express one’s beliefs without 
fearing that the government may obtain that information. Solove explains the 
complications of the digital revolution and democratic freedoms, stating:  
[P]rivacy of associations is becoming more difficult in a world where 
online postings are archived, where a list of the people a person contacts 
can easily be generated from telephone and email records, and where 
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accessed March 12, 2014). 
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records reveal where a person travels, what websites she visits, and so 
on.11 
 
The digital revolution brought ease of communication and access to information, 
however, online associations, such as religious group activity or communications with 
others, are much easier for government actors or other individuals to obtain. The web is 
largely open and accessible, and many online activities are not as private as many 
assume. However, where can we draw a line to guard freedoms such as the right to 
associate in cyberspace? We reasonably expect privacy in various areas of the internet 
and technology, such as personal emails and medical information. However, it is 
increasingly difficult to maintain privacy in these areas. Despite laws and constitutional 
provisions to help protect privacy, our personal information is not strongly guarded. 
Privacy Protection in Law 
For the first century of the U.S. as a nation, government violations of privacy 
were mainly limited to tangible searches of homes and personal documents. However, 
technological development created new avenues for privacy violations. Congress enacted 
various pieces of legislation to protect privacy in several matters; however, privacy 
legislation has been focused and does not protect the wide range of potential privacy 
invasions created by information and technology usage. For example, few legislative acts 
protect state and local records and records from department stores, libraries, charities, and 
other merchants, which leaves large holes in privacy protection.12  
Several pieces of legislation have been enacted to protect personal privacy in 
specific areas. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Solove, 63.  
12 Ibid. 
	   Moller 21 
provides an example of focused legislation to guard a student’s right to privacy. FERPA 
protects a student’s transcripts and educational information from wrongful disclosure.13 
Protecting educational information privacy, FERPA allows students to control the use of 
their records. Another example of privacy legislation was enacted in response to Robert 
Bork’s controversial Supreme Court nomination battle. Bork’s video rental records were 
disclosed during the nomination process, and many believed that disclosure of such 
information was a violation of Bork’s privacy. Subsequently, the Video Privacy 
Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988 was enacted to protect an individual’s video store 
records.14 Although FERPA and the VPPA are only two examples of legislation to 
protect personal privacy, the two acts demonstrate the focused nature of privacy 
legislation. Legislation functions well to provide some privacy protection, however, with 
extreme focus, acts are not often responsive to technological changes. Legislation has 
helped to define the rights to privacy in particular matters, however, many areas have 
been left unprotected. 
State and United Nations Privacy Protection 
Although the U.S. Constitution does not address privacy, several states expressly 
guarantee privacy protection in their constitutions. Florida’s Constitution, for example, 
states that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from 
governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided 
herein.”15 Likewise, California embraces privacy as an inalienable right, stating, “[a]ll 
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people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, 
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”16 However, there are only a 
handful of states that acknowledge the right to privacy in their constitutions, and as 
demonstrated by the NSA controversy discussed later in this work, the right to privacy 
can be difficult to enforce when considering the capability of new technologies and the 
importance of preventing threats to national security.  
In addition to state acknowledgment of privacy rights, the United Nations has also 
addressed the right to privacy in light of emerging technologies. In 2013, the United 
Nations drafted a resolution to preserve individual privacy. Named “The Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age,” the resolution acknowledges the rapid development of technology 
and the necessity to respond with appropriate privacy protections. The resolution notes 
that invasion of digital privacy may trigger UN Human Rights Violations, as well as UN 
Civil and Political Rights violations.17 Privacy, the resolution explains, helps to maintain 
truly democratic societies and freedom of expression.18 The resolution acknowledges that 
“concerns about public security may justify the gathering and protection of certain 
sensitive information, [however,] States must ensure full compliance with their 
obligations under international human rights law” to ensure democratic, human rights, 
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and political principles.19 Discussed more fully later in this work, many allege that the 
NSA’s surveillance program violates constitutional and statutory law. The UN resolution 
recommends that nations review their “surveillance of communications [and] their 
interception and collection of personal data” to verify compliance with national and 
international law.20 Although the resolution does not have binding power on nations to 
review their programs and reform their laws to ensure personal information privacy, the 
resolution helps to call attention to the kinds of invasions of privacy that have become a 
reality in the past decade and the importance of preserving the right to privacy in light of 
the digital revolution. The resolution calls for transparency and oversight to ensure 
privacy protections.  
The Fourth Amendment’s Privacy Protections 
Warren, Brandeis, several Supreme Court opinions, and a few state constitutions 
have illuminated that privacy should be valued as an inherent right. It is difficult, 
however, to define privacy in relation to technology. Neither legislative nor constitutional 
precedent provides sweeping definitions of privacy that can be easily applied to the 
dimensions of privacy in technology and electronic communications. The U.S. 
Constitution does not explicitly address the right to privacy. However, several court cases 
have helped to define the right to privacy and the instances in which we maintain a 
reasonable expectation to privacy. In a dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 
Justice Brandeis recognized the difficulty of preserving privacy in the shadow of 
technological advancement and expressed that, “discovery and invention have made it 
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possible for the government . . . to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the 
closet.”21 Advancement in technology has made it easier for the government to obtain 
incriminating or private information from citizens. However, adequate legal privacy 
protections have not accompanied the expansion of technology.   
The Fourth Amendment offers privacy protection against government actors 
performing unreasonable searches and seizures. Originally proposed by James Madison, 
the text of the Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.22 
 
When the amendment was proposed, Americans wanted to protect against the British 
army’s “general warrants,” in which soldiers could perform searches and seizures with or 
without evidentiary basis. 23 To guard against general searches, the Amendment explains 
that the government can search personal information and possessions under the 
Amendment’s provisions, however, searches must be focused, controlled, and justified, 
and the Amendment does not apply to information and objects in plain view.24 However, 
the text is fairly ambiguous and neither its language nor the history of the Amendment 
helps to clearly define the Amendment’s application to technology.25  
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The Fourth Amendment is often referenced as a means for government officials to 
discover criminal evidence. The Amendment’s primary function, however, is as a 
protection to non-criminals. The Fourth Amendment protects the innocent from 
unreasonable searches and invasions of privacy, ensuring that government officials 
cannot search or seize a citizen’s personal information or possessions without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. As Schulhofer explains, the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
privacy to help “[foster] the sense of personal security that is necessary for individual 
autonomy and political liberty in a free society.”26 It ensures that government actors will 
not search citizens arbitrarily. Its use to protect individuals from unlawful searches and 
seizures helps to ensure a degree of privacy, thus allowing citizens to freely express 
themselves without fear of unreasonable government seizure of their information. With 
the development of technology, however, searches that may have been previously been 
impossible to undertake without violating privacy are much more accessible, and the 
right to privacy in the context of technology is unclear. 
Katz and Olmstead 
 Several Supreme Court cases have addressed technology and the right to privacy. 
Two such cases are Olmstead v. United States and Katz v. United States. Both cases 
demonstrate law enforcement’s direct access to communication content via wiretap. 
Wiretaps access communications information directly from the source, rather than 
obtaining information from a third party such as a telephone company. In Olmstead, 
decided in 1928, the petitioner was accused of coordinating a bootlegging operation in 
violation of the National Prohibition Act. To collect evidence against him, law 	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enforcement wiretapped Olmstead’s office and home and listened to his telephone 
conversations. The Supreme Court was petitioned to determine whether the wiretap 
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Court ruled that wiretapping did not 
violate Olmstead’s rights and did not qualify as a search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment applies to tangible evidence, such as 
papers or possessions, the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
conversations or other intangible information.27 Olmstead set a precedent for application 
of the Fourth Amendment and defined that it only applies to tangible possessions and 
information. If the precedent had continued into modern times, the content of 
communications, such as phone conversations, emails, text message, and video calls 
would have very little protection from direct access by law enforcement.  
 The Olmstead precedent stood for nearly forty years until the Supreme Court 
again addressed the issue of communications content privacy in United States v. Katz in 
1967. In Katz, the Supreme Court considered whether it was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to record incriminating conversations from the source of the call. Katz was 
accused of communicating illegal gambling information over the phone, and police 
placed eavesdropping equipment on a public phone to gather evidence against him. 
Overturning Olmstead, the Supreme Court determined that intruding on conversations 
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart, writing the 
majority opinion in the 7-1 decision, explained that the “Fourth Amendment protects 
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people, not places.”28 The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment extends to protect both 
tangible items, such as personal documents, as well as intangible conversations and data. 
 The search performed in Katz was focused and based in strong evidence that 
illegal information was being communicated on the phone. However, the Court explained 
that the police had not obtained a warrant and the conversation was not in public, thus 
Katz had a reasonable expectation to privacy in his conversation.29 The Court stated: 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.30 
 
Katz placed the call in a closed phone booth and assumed that the information conveyed 
would be private. This principle introduced the distinction between context and content 
information. Information knowingly conveyed to the public or to a third party does not 
retain Fourth Amendment rights, while contents of a communication are usually assumed 
private.31 The distinction between content and context information is clearly 
demonstrated by Ex parte Jackson, in which the Supreme Court ruled that “[n]o law 
could empower the government, via its postal inspectors, to violate the protections 
afforded to the contents of sealed letters and packages by the Fourth Amendment.”32 
Context information, such as the address on a letter, is openly conveyed and is not private 
information. Content information, such as the content of a mailed letter, is not openly 
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communicated, and thus one can assume that the information will remain private. With 
the amount of information transmitted on the internet and cell phones through third 
parties, this distinction becomes important in the digital age. 
Aside from the distinction between context and content information, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan introduced a test to determine the expectation of privacy. In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan argued that Katz held a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
conversation.33 Katz placed his call in a phone booth with the door shut and presumed 
that his conversation would be private. Harlan agrees that this expectation of privacy is 
reasonable and should be constitutionally protected.34 Although it may be difficult to 
discern a defendant’s expectation to privacy in each particular situation before the Court, 
Harlan argues that without a warrant and where an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the individual’s right to privacy should prevail. 
 In Katz and Olmstead, communications were accessed directly from the source 
and thus retain Fourth Amendment protection based on current precedent. Today, many 
of our communications take place via third parties, and the Supreme Court has 
established that information communicated to third parties often forfeits the right to 
Fourth Amendment protection in that information. The distinction between content and 
context introduced in Katz and Ex parte Jackson becomes an important consideration in 
the right to privacy in electronic communications received by third parties. Some courts 
and scholars have argued that the content of communications should retain Fourth 
Amendment protections, while the context information communicated to third parties 
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gives up the right to privacy in that information. Others, however, contend that both 
context and content communication information conveyed to third parties have become 
so commonplace that they should retain Fourth Amendment protections despite being 
conveyed to multiple parties.
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CHAPTER 2: CURRENT COURT AND LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS TO 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION 
Limited protection exists to preserve privacy in communications. In the past 
decade, courts and legislative measures have established that much of our communication 
information does not require a warrant to obtain. Nearly all of our communications today 
take place via third parties, and many court cases have established that citizens do not 
have a reasonable expectation to privacy in third-party communications information. 
Aside from the courts, legislation has also expressed that upon third party receipt of 
communication information, privacy in that information is extinguished. With increasing 
use of email and phone communications, are we giving up our right to privacy as we 
adopt new and convenient methods of communication?  
Both the Supreme Court and Congress have endeavored to define the limits of 
data protection; the Supreme Court established the third party doctrine and Congress 
enacted the SCA. The Supreme Court’s third party doctrine allows the government to 
seize information revealed to a third party without a warrant. Even if information is 
conveyed for a specific purpose, information is not protected from government search 
and seizure via court order or subpoena. Judges or partial prosecutors can issue 
subpoenas, and court orders only require “relevance” to an investigation.1 Warrants, on 
the other hand, are evaluated by neutral judges and are based on “probable cause,” a 
standard much higher than that of a subpoena or court order.2 Third party 
communications companies, such as internet service providers (ISP), store customer 	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information in service databases accessible by subpoenas, court orders, or warrants. The 
Supreme Court has adopted the third party doctrine as a main tenant to decide the 
admissibility of third party searches.  
Congress has also attempted to regulate data privacy. The Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) was enacted in 1986 as a part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, and it has remained the primary third party data privacy 
law since enacted. The SCA governs the ability for government and other parties to 
obtain information from electronic communications companies and defines the ability of 
third party communications companies to disclose the information that they receive. 
However, as technology continues to develop and as third parties become more 
entrenched as our main means of communication, should the law guarantee a higher 
degree of privacy in our third party communications information? The SCA and the third 
party doctrine provide basic substantive, explanatory means to define our current privacy 
rights, however, both leave something to be desired in regard to privacy guaranteed in our 
communications information. This section will explore the third party doctrine, 
legislative data protection, and when we can expect privacy in our electronic 
communications.  
The Supreme Court and the Third Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has established the third party doctrine to govern the privacy 
of communications that take place through third parties, including electronic 
communications information. Several cases demonstrate the Court’s use of the third party 
doctrine and its role in society. Although originally applied to non-electronic 
communications, the doctrine has been adapted to electronic communications, such as 
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email and phone calls. Application to emerging technologies presents complications, 
particularly as we have begun to rely on third parties to facilitate communications. The 
doctrine, however, has long existed as a part of the judicial system and provides a bright-
line rule to determine privacy in communications. 
The Fourth Amendment’s relationship with electronic communications and 
internet communications is complex. Kerr, explaining the ambiguity in applying the 
Fourth Amendment to the internet, says: 
A user does not have a physical “home,” nor really any private space at 
all. Instead, a user typically is owned by a network service provider, such 
as America Online or Comcast. Although a user may think of that storage 
space as a “virtual home,” in fact that “home is really just a block of ones 
and zeros stored somewhere on somebody else’s computer. This means 
that when we use the Internet, we communicate with and through that 
remote computer to contact other computers. Our most private information 
ends up being sent to private third parties and held far away on remote 
network servers.3 
 
Electronic communications are much easier to obtain than papers kept in an individual’s 
home. To obtain electronic communication information, the government can issue a 
warrant, subpoena, or court order for information stored with third parties.4 Furthermore, 
if a company required a customer to sign a consent-to-disclosure contract before 
providing a service, the consumer may forfeit the right to privacy in the information 
conveyed to the third party. To limit abuses to third party information, both the courts 
and Congress have enacted protections. However, electronic information stored with third 
parties has much weaker privacy protections than other communications, and many 
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consumers are unaware of the rights affected by use of third parties for electronic 
communications.  
The Supreme Court has demonstrated the third party doctrine in several cases. In 
United States v. Miller in 1976, the Court established that bank accounts could be 
searched as long as law enforcement obtained a subpoena.5 After issuing subpoenas for 
Miller’s bank information, the bank released his records to the police to examine for 
evidence of unpaid liquor taxes.6 Miller challenged the search under his Fourth 
Amendment rights. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Potter Stewart explained that, 
[t]here is no legitimate “expectation of privacy” in the contents of the 
original checks and deposit slips, since the checks are not confidential 
communications, but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions, and all the documents obtained contain only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.7  
 
Although we may wish the utmost privacy in financial matters, keeping records with 
banks and financial institutions forfeits the right to keep monetary information wholly 
private. Once an individual communicates financial or other information to a third party, 
one can no longer expect complete privacy regarding that information.  A few years after 
the Miller decision, the Court issued a similar decision in United States v. Payner, in 
which Justice Stewart reinforced the third party doctrine.8 In Payner, police agents stole a 
briefcase containing incriminating bank account information during an investigation. The 	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Supreme Court held that the case was indistinguishable from Miller, ruling in favor of the 
third party doctrine to judge the right to privacy in the banking information. In Miller, 
Payner, and several other cases, the Supreme Court firmly established the third party 
doctrine as it relates to tangible paper copies of information conveyed to third parties. 
 The third party doctrine also applies to verbal communications between 
individuals. The courts saw a wave of cases in the latter half of the twentieth century 
addressing information revealed to secret agents, and Lee v. United States demonstrates 
use of the third party doctrine in this context. After revealing incriminating details to an 
undercover agent, Lee argued that the use of a secret agent qualified as an unlawful 
search inside of his store.9 The Supreme Court, however, reasoned that someone could 
not reasonably expect information conveyed to another individual to remain secret, even 
if Lee had trusted that the man would keep the information private. Once information is 
communicated to another party, the expectation of privacy diminishes because the 
information is voluntarily disclosed and one cannot predict how the recipient will use the 
information communicated. This doctrine was applied in a similar context in several 
cases throughout the twentieth century and helped to firmly establish the third party 
doctrine as it pertains to verbal communications between individuals.  
 The Third Party Doctrine and Electronic Communications  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to address 
third party doctrine cases involving new technologies. In 1979, the Supreme Court 
applied the third party doctrine to telephones in Smith v. Maryland. After identifying 
Smith as an accused robber, the police installed a pen register to monitor Smith’s phone 	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calls. The Court reasoned that context phone call information, such as phone numbers, 
the duration of a call, and the time the call was placed do not fall under the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the majority opinion and explained the 
Court’s reasoning:   
[I]t is doubtful that telephone users in general have any expectation of 
privacy regarding the numbers they dial, since they typically know that 
they must convey phone numbers to the telephone company and that the 
company has its facilities for recording this information and does in fact 
record it for various legitimate business purposes.10 
 
By communicating through a third party telephone operator, the Supreme Court ruled that 
citizens should not expect that their call information is private. By voluntarily disclosing 
context information to telephone companies, one can assume that the information 
conveyed may be recorded for billing or other business purposes. Blackmun continued, 
stating that when Smith “conveyed numerical information to the phone company and . . . 
its equipment in the normal course of business, he assumed the risk that the company 
would reveal the information to the police.”11 Once someone discloses information to a 
communications company, she or he forfeits the right to keep the numbers dialed private. 
In an important distinction, Smith differentiates between context and content information 
as highlighted in Katz and Ex parte Jackson. The pen register monitored only the phone 
numbers Smith dialed, rather than Smith’s phone conversations. The Court in Smith did 
not grant government the ability to obtain the conversations relayed during Smith’s phone 
calls.  
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 Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court firmly established the third 
party doctrine in relation to third party communications of various kinds. If an individual 
reveals information to another person, business, or other entity, one can no longer assume 
that the information revealed will remain private. With the development and frequency of 
communications on cell phones, tablets, and computers, the third party doctrine assumes 
that any communication through an outside entity, such as Verizon or Comcast, is readily 
discoverable. With the prevalence of communications through third parties and very few 
alternatives, should the courts continue to apply the third party doctrine as they have in 
the past or should the doctrine be tailored to reconcile with technological developments 
and their predominance in society?  
A Necessary Distinction: An Argument for the Third Party Doctrine 
The third party doctrine is controversial. It seeks to balance information privacy 
and the ability for law enforcement to obtain evidence against alleged criminals. Should 
our right to privacy accommodate the ability of government to obtain data to prevent 
crime or identify criminals? Is it reasonable to expect that some of our information, such 
as the content of our phone calls and text messages, will remain private unless essential to 
thwart an impending national security threat? Various scholars have debated the merits of 
the third party doctrine and how to apply the doctrine in light of the digital revolution.  
Those in support of the third party doctrine contend that it provides a general 
standard under which the government can judge the ability to retrieve personal data and 
information conveyed to a third party.12 When we convey information to another party, it 
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may not be reasonable to assume that some of the information, such as the context 
information, will not be used for other purposes. Even in verbal communications, we 
cannot presume that the other individual will keep the information communicated private. 
We often give up information in order to obtain a service, and third parties must store that 
information for purposes such as billing. In a sense, as privacy law scholar Orin Kerr 
suggests, we consent to the use of our information when we voluntarily disclose it to a 
third party to use that information.13 
Some scholars argue that the third party doctrine “ensures technological neutrality 
in the Fourth Amendment rules” and thus eliminates the ability of criminals to keep 
otherwise public aspects of crime private.14 Without the third party doctrine, criminals 
could use technology to hide what would otherwise be a public aspect of a crime.15 The 
third party doctrine ensures that criminals cannot hide their information from government 
search and seizure by invoking Fourth Amendment rights long after the information has 
been communicated to others.16 For example, whereas someone would previously have 
had to purchase an illegal item in person, many transactions can be completed over the 
internet or other electronic communications, thus guarding the information from law 
enforcement under Fourth Amendment protections. The third-party doctrine guarantees 
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that communications that were previously discoverable are still discoverable with the 
development of new technologies.  
Kerr also points out a valuable characteristic of the third party doctrine: it 
provides “ex ante clarity.”17 Kerr’s conception of the third party doctrine eliminates 
Fourth Amendment rights when the third party receives the information communicated; 
he states, “the present location of information defines the Fourth Amendment rules for 
collecting it, and the Fourth Amendment rules are constant within each location.”18 This 
principle maintains Fourth Amendment protections at the origin of the communication, 
such as an individual’s personal computer or information in transit to the third party. 
Once the information reaches the third party, the third party doctrine is applied and the 
Fourth Amendment no longer protects that information. Providing this distinction helps 
to discern when Fourth Amendment protections are triggered. Otherwise, it may be 
difficult to determine in which situations an individual believed they had an expectation 
to information privacy.  
Although it may be harder to rationalize in some cases, the third party doctrine 
allows for more consistent application of the Fourth Amendment and draws a line to 
determine privacy protections in an area that may otherwise be ambiguous and difficult to 
discern in application. Kerr aptly demonstrates the doctrine’s bright-line rule, stating,  
[u]nder the third-party doctrine, if A tells a secret to B, A has no rights in 
B’s possession of the information. If the third-party doctrine is rejected, 
however, A’s rights in that information should continue even though B has 
the information now in addition to A.19 
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In the absence of a third party doctrine, where do we draw the line regarding privacy 
rights of information? Is there ever a point in which information is not protected by a 
reasonable expectation of privacy if the third party doctrine is eliminated? The third party 
doctrine may provide necessary clarity and neutrality in the application of the Fourth 
Amendment and privacy rights.  
Critique of the Third Party Doctrine 
Although Kerr and other scholars contend that the third party doctrine is 
necessary to discern privacy protections, many also illuminate the doctrine’s weakness in 
preserving privacy in communications, especially when considered in light of the 
frequency of use of third parties for communication. The third party doctrine provides an 
easier-to-apply bright-line rule, however, it assumes that we give up the right to 
information and data privacy as soon as another party receives information. Many believe 
that the right to information privacy should be further extended, particularly as most of 
our communications today take place through third parties. 
Dissenting in Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall expressed the majority’s failure 
to uphold the expectation of reasonable information privacy. Justice Marshall illuminated 
the weakness of the doctrine’s privacy protections, stating “[i]t is idle to speak of 
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic 
alternative.”20 Justice Marshall recognized that there are few substitute methods of 
communication that Smith could have used to keep his information private, and it is 
unreasonable to expect Smith not to use telephone communications if he wished to keep 
his telephone communication information private. Marshall believed that the Supreme 	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Court’s decision would be “disturbing” even to those who did not have anything to hide 
in their information and communications. He explained that many individuals, such as 
journalists and “unpopular political organizations” may wish to keep their 
communications and contacts private, and that “[p]ermitting government access to 
telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political 
affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society.”21 
Marshall’s dissent demonstrates one of the major criticisms of the third party doctrine. A 
“realistic alternative” is not always available for communications, particularly with the 
prevalence of online and phone communications in the modern world. Communications 
via third parties are extremely common, and under the third party doctrine, many people 
sacrifice the right to privacy in everyday communication and information sharing. 
Marshall highlights the potential dangers to democratic freedoms that can arise when 
information privacy is not strictly maintained. 
 Another criticism of the third party doctrine is that it grants the government easier 
access to communications.22 Justice Harlan articulated this critique in United States v. 
White. In White, the petitioner argued that placement of an informant to collect 
incriminating information violated Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Harlan challenged 
the Court’s use of the third party doctrine, stating that it granted the government too 
much power to monitor conversations. Like Marshall, Harlan reasoned that the doctrine 
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could threaten public discourse, thus endangering democratic principles by forcing 
citizens to be wary of what they communicate to others.23 Based on current third party 
doctrine application, the government can obtain information such as emails and text 
messages without probable cause and a warrant, which may endanger freedom of 
expression. Court orders and subpoenas are much easier to obtain, thus allowing easier 
access to otherwise private communications. Some argue that the third party doctrine 
should be reformed to fairly consider the prevalence of third parties in new methods of 
communication. 24 
Highlighting another critique of the doctrine, law professor Erin Murphy argues 
that many aspects of crimes are not committed in public as Kerr argues. Murphy argues 
that “[w]e do not obliterate privacy protections for the home, for instance, just because 
the vast majority of child sexual abuse occurs there.”25 Not all crimes are committed in 
public, and it may be improper to assume that there is a public aspect to every crime that 
could be hidden with new technologies. Without the third party doctrine, technological 
development could allow criminals to hide their transactions on the internet and or other 
means protected by the Fourth Amendment, whereas these actions used to be conducted 
in public.26 Murphy, however, argues that most criminals will not take the time to ensure 
their criminal acts are hidden in technological and constitutional protections and that the 
third party doctrine is superfluous in this respect.27   
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In addition, opponents of the doctrine believe that the Supreme Court has thus far 
improperly judged that private matters disclosed to one other party equates to disclosure 
to all. Privacy scholar Daniel Solove, an opponent to the third party doctrine, argues that 
the doctrine understands privacy as complete secrecy or as complete disclosure, rather 
than as varying degrees of privacy.28 Solove believes that even if an individual conveys 
information to a third party company for a service and loses privacy rights in regard to 
that company, the individual should still have control over disclosure of that information 
to other parties. Large amounts of data and personal information are conveyed in 
everyday use of technology, and individuals should have the ability to control the privacy 
of their information. 
The third party doctrine is controversial, and various scholars and judges have 
evaluated the merits of the doctrine. The next section details the proportionality principle; 
an alternative to the third party doctrine that several scholars believe better preserves 
individual privacy in communications information. Just like the third party doctrine, 
however, the proportionality principle is not without fault, and some scholars, such as 
Kerr, argue that the doctrine is too ambiguous in application, whereas the third party 
doctrine provides more clarity. 
An Idealistic Alternative: The Proportionality Principle 
 Privacy scholar Christopher Slobogin contends that we cannot rely on the third 
party doctrine to properly protect our privacy. Instead, to preserve an individual’s 
reasonable expectation to privacy, cases should be evaluated under the “proportionality 
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principle.”29 This doctrine argues that law enforcement must “[calibrate] the justification 
for an action by reference to its impact on the affected party.”30 This allows for 
consideration of whether the search inhibits an individual’s fundamental right when 
determining the constitutionality of a search.31 The proportionality principle is 
demonstrated in Terry v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court said, “[t]here can be ‘no 
ready test for determining the reasonableness [of a search] other than by balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”32 The proportionality 
principle allows consideration of a broader set of factors to determine Fourth Amendment 
protection, rather than the third party doctrine’s bright-line rule. It allows judges and law 
enforcement to consider the individual’s reasonable expectation to privacy in the 
information. Slobogin, however, explains that the courts have not consistently applied the 
proportionality principle in search and seizure jurisprudence.  
 Despite inconsistent application, the proportionality principle could offer an 
alternative to the third party doctrine to better preserve personal privacy. Applying the 
proportionality principle, government officers would have to determine the invasiveness 
of the search in relation to an individual’s right to privacy. Less-invasive searches would 
require a lesser degree of cause for search, such as relevancy to an ongoing investigation, 
while more invasive searches would require a higher standard, such as probable cause. It 
would allow discretion in deciding the reasonableness of a search and whether it invades 
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the fundamental right to privacy; however, this discretion could either help maintain the 
right to privacy, or it could lead to bias or to inconsistent rulings in similar cases, which 
is contrary to the ideals of the American justice system. 
With the vast amount of transactions, data, and information that passes through 
the web and via smart phones, this doctrine may be difficult to apply. It necessitates that 
law enforcement discern which searches are invasive enough to trigger an invasion of 
privacy and would require the courts to evaluate each case and identify whether or not 
Fourth Amendment rights apply. Although strict application guidelines and the appeals 
process can help to protect against wrongful searches under the proportionality principle, 
the third party doctrine’s bright-line rule provides clarity and efficiency that judicial and 
police discretion cannot. Furthermore, it is hard to discern if an individual’s right to 
privacy has been violated and whether an individual expected privacy in his or her 
communication information. Kerr explains that electronic communication “history is 
often complex and impossible to reconstruct. Just as a glass of water from a kitchen sink 
tap might have been rainwater in the Amazon thousands of years ago, information today 
often has a long past of interpersonal transmission.”33 It is difficult to determine the 
expectation of privacy an individual held regarding information passed through channels 
of communication. A new definition would need to be developed to help define the limits 
of the expectation to privacy under the proportionality principle.   
The proportionality principle may offer an alternative route of privacy protection, 
however, the third party doctrine provides more clarity in application. Although the third 
party doctrine is not without faults, it provides an effective rule to determine information 	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privacy. Aside from court-constructed doctrines to determine our right to third party 
communications privacy, Congress has also addressed the issue and created legislation to 
help define the expectation to privacy in the digital age. 
Legislative Protections 
The Stored Communications Act 
In the 1980s, Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment assessed legal 
protections to emerging technologies and the privacy rights of individuals. Finding 
inadequate privacy protections for electronic communications, Congress began 
brainstorming legislation to outline the right to privacy in electronic communications.34 
Congress previously enacted the Wiretap Act of 1968 to prevent unlawful wiretaps, 
however, emerging technologies began changing the way Americans communicated and 
introduced a new set of technologies to consider.  
Recognizing the need for stronger privacy protection in electronic 
communications, Congress developed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA). After their initial investigation into privacy protections, the House and Senate 
Committees concluded that “[a]lthough the principle of the [F]ourth [A]mendment is 
timeless, its application has not kept abreast of current technologies.”35 Congress further 
concluded that “given the high threat to civil liberties posed by interception of electronic 
mail … the governmental interest in interception [is] quite compelling.”36 Emerging 
technologies required new legislative protections to ensure the right to privacy. In an 	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initial report, Congress discussed that e-mail messages stored on the author’s computer or 
e-mail account would likely fall under Fourth Amendment protections, however, 
messages “in-transit” or stored on a remote server were not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment or by legislation.37 Congress ruled that messages in-transit and in third party 
storage needed statutory protections. 
The first section of the ECPA amends the Wiretap Act of 1968 to include 
electronic communications, rather than just wire communications. The Wiretap Act 
governs the ability to intercept communications in transit to another party and defines 
intercepting as use of any device to seize communication content while being transmitted 
electronically.38 Information protected by the Wiretap Act, however, can be accessed 
with a court order specifying the particular time, place, and type of communication, as 
well as clear evidence that criminal activity is being relayed in the communication.39 The 
Wiretap Act provides important limits on the ability of the government to obtain 
information in-transit. However, the Act only requires a court order to gain access rights 
to interception of a communication. Prior jurisprudence has held that content information 
requires a warrant to obtain, as demonstrated by Katz v. United States. Although the Act 
helps to protect against wrongful interception of communications, it should offer stronger 
legal standards to protect information privacy.  
The second section of the ECPA created the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 
to protect material in electronic storage, such as third party records of an email account. 
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The SCA helped to define the limits of unlawful access to third party electronic 
communication information. Kerr explains the basic protections of the SCA, stating that 
it:  
creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, 
regulating the relationship between government investigators and service 
providers in possession of users’ private information. It does this in two 
ways. First, the statute creates limits on the government’s ability to 
compel providers to disclose information in their possession about their 
customers and subscribers. … Second, the statute places limits on the 
ability of ISPs to voluntarily disclose information about their customers 
and subscribers to the government.40 
 
The statute protects both content and context information of users of third party 
communications services, and it acknowledges both third party use of data and 
government requests for data. The Act states that third parties must provide the name, 
address, phone connection records, services utilized, phone number or network address, 
and how the individual paid for the service if a warrant, subpoena, or court order is issued 
for the information .41 The SCA prohibits ISPs and phone companies from sharing 
content information without a warrant in most cases.42  However, the SCA makes several 
other distinctions that allow law enforcement to obtain content information without a 
warrant. 
Although the Act protects content data in most situations, the SCA’s distinction 
between Electronic Communication Services (ECS), which are services that offer users 
the ability to communicate via wire or electronic signal, and Remote Computing Services 
(RCS), which are defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
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communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof” allow the government to 
obtain content data without a warrant.43 An ECS communication, for example, is an 
unopened email in a recipient’s personal e-mail account. However, if an email is viewed 
and not deleted by the recipient, it becomes an RCS communication stored on the ISP’s 
server. Furthermore, the SCA only covers public ISPs, such as Gmail or Yahoo! 
Accounts. The SCA does not govern private ISPs, such as government or university 
servers, which are instead evaluated under the Fourth Amendment.44  
The Act prohibits both RCS and ECS services from automatically disclosing data 
to government sources, however, the SCA’s distinction between RCS and ECS allows 
government access to content information without a warrant.  The Act states that with a 
warrant, government authorities can access information stored in an ECS within 180 days 
of its receipt. However, if ECS data is more than 180 days old or stored within a RCS, it 
can be obtained with a warrant, subpoena, or court order. Subpoenas and court orders 
only require that law enforcement show that the material is relevant to an ongoing 
investigation.45 In addition, law enforcement has 90 days to inform the individual being 
searched, rather than requiring immediate notice of a search.46 This standard for 
protection is much less robust than the protection guaranteed to content information by 
the Fourth Amendment and the precedent set in Katz.47 Whereas warrants require 
probable cause, court orders rely on an easier burden of proof, allowing government 
officials to more easily access RCS data and ECS data more than 180 days old. 	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45 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, § 2703 (c)(10)(D). 
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When the ECPA was established, email servers did not automatically store 
individual communications; a user would have to manually place the email into a saved 
folder to keep emails past 180 days.  Today, however, many store their communications 
for long periods of time, and email providers allow storage of large quantities email data. 
In addition, many phone companies store text message data, and third-party data storage 
services, such as Dropbox, provide users with storage space for data and documents. The 
SCA’s RCS and ECS qualifications have become obsolete in light of technological 
development, and new legislation to address electronic information privacy protections 
should be considered to augment the SCA’s current protections.  
In special cases, other means can replace the SCA’s requirements for a warrant, 
court order, or subpoena. As demonstrated by the 2013 NSA surveillance controversy, 
government officials can request a “national security letter” to request communications in 
the interest of immediate national security needs.48 National security letter requests do 
not require regular judicial approval, but the information obtained must be demonstrated 
as “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities” to a special judge.49 As discussed later in this paper, 
national security letters greatly expanded the government’s ability to obtain 
communications information, and many have debated the legality and constitutionality of 
national security letters and the NSA’s data collection program. 
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The Courts and The SCA 
The SCA, like the third-party doctrine, is controversial. Many believe that the Act 
does not provide adequate protection to content information or properly address new 
technologies, while others believe its framework provides the necessary basis to 
determine the ability of law enforcement to obtain electronic communications 
information. Despite the SCA’s distinction between RCS and ECS communications, 
many courts now apply that a message retains its ECS protections until “the underlying 
message has expired in the normal course,” regardless of whether the message has been 
opened by the recipient.50 This application may better serve our current use of stored 
communications, however, it should be consistently applied in order to fully protect the 
privacy of communications information. 
In Warshak v. United States, a case argued in the U.S. Appeals Court for the Sixth 
Circuit in 2010, a court order was issued to obtain Warshak’s emails over 180 days old.51 
Warshak argued that the government’s access to his emails violated the Fourth 
Amendment, while the government claimed that the SCA authorized access to Warshak’s 
email content. The court ruled that the content of emails should require a warrant to 
obtain and that there is a reasonable expectation to privacy in email content.52 The court 
argued that the SCA’s warrantless access to content information was unconstitutional and 
that Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search, however, the court 
allowed the provisions of the SCA to prevail and did not exclude the emails from 	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Warshak’s trial. In the court’s reasoning, the SCA allowed the government to effectively 
circumvent Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights to obtain content material.  
The SCA was again addressed in City of Ontario v. Quon. City police department 
employee Jeff Quon used a city-issued pager to send sexually explicit text messages to a 
colleague. The police department had a general technology policy that stated that 
employees “should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using [city-
issued] resources.”53 Quon and other department employees claimed that the 
department’s search of the pager message content violated both the Fourth Amendment 
and the SCA, because the information was acquired without a court order, subpoena, or 
warrant.54 Judging the case in 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court drew upon Katz to rule that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the content of text messages and that the 
police department’s search of the pager content violated Quon’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.55 The decision was petitioned to the Supreme Court, and in a 9-0 decision in 2010, 
the Court held that the text message search was constitutional.56 Writing the majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the “[p]etitioners’ warrantless review of Quon’s 
pager transcript was reasonable … because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related 
purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope.”57 The Court did not fully address 
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Fourth Amendment content issues or the SCA and instead relied on the reasonableness of 
the search to justify the search’s constitutionality. The Court relied on precedent set in	  
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, which established that “where an employee has a 
legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation “for 
noninvestigatory, work-related purpose, as well as for investigations of work-related 
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the 
circumstances.””58 The Court in Quon, although petitioned on violations of the Fourth 
Amendment and the SCA, decided the case based on Von Raab, which helped to define 
information privacy rights in the workplace. 
For better or for worse, new technologies and methods of communication are 
discoverable by the government without a warrant in certain situations. Although the 
SCA and the Supreme Court’s third party doctrine seek to clarify the situations in which 
we can expect information privacy, application of each is complex and many courts and 
scholars have argued against both. As cell phones and internet communications have 
become our main means of communication, how should the issue of privacy and 
government access to communications be resolved in the future? Should we rely on the 
Supreme Court to outline our privacy rights, or should Congress enact legislation to 
enhance our communications privacy rights? Furthermore, how should traditional context 
and content jurisprudence apply to the issue of national security and the NSA’s data? 
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CHAPTER 3: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S 
COLLECTION OF THIRD PARTY RECORDS 
The NSA’s surveillance program provides a pertinent example to examine in light 
of the third party doctrine and the SCA. In 2013, former NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden leaked information and secret documents of the NSA’s warrantless surveillance 
program, and in response, many Americans became greatly concerned with 
communications privacy. Several citizens filed court cases against the government’s data 
collection. Snowden’s leaks were first published in the British news source The 
Guardian, in which he revealed that on “an ongoing daily basis . . . all call detail records 
or ‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications” are monitored by the 
NSA.1 After the first leaks were exposed, more details about the NSA’s surveillance of 
phone and internet communications were released, and many questions were raised 
regarding the legality and constitutionality of the NSA’s program. The government has 
argued that the NSA surveillance program serves a compelling government interest to 
identify possible national security threats, however, the Snowden leaks have left many 
Americans wondering whether the government is obstructing their right to privacy. 
Following 9/11, President George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act to enhance the 
government’s ability to obtain phone and internet records. The Patriot Act allows the FBI 
and other government officials to obtain records without a warrant, court order, or 
subpoena in the interest of national security, granted a national security letter is issued to 
authorize access to the information. To protect the legality of the government’s actions, 
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the Patriot Act amended the SCA’s applicability to government, only maintaining that 
citizens can “sue the United States for money for claims arising out of the Wiretap Act, 
the Stored Communications Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.”2 By 
amending the SCA’s provisions as they apply to the government, traditional SCA 
protections governing content and context data are replaced by national security letters, 
which can be easier to obtain than a warrant, court order, or subpoena. 
In order to further enhance surveillance, Congress passed the FISA Amendments 
Act in 2008, which allows the NSA to monitor foreign targets without obtaining a 
warrant.3 By obtaining foreign communication information without a warrant, law 
enforcement can more quickly analyze data to identify possible terror threats. The current 
NSA program allows the government to access a wide range of communications without 
a warrant and without the limitations of the SCA. The program collects telephone 
information, email, text messages, web communications, and internet activity both in the 
U.S. and between the U.S. and foreign sources.4 PRISM, the NSA’s major data collection 
program allows government to monitor communications by collecting information from 
third party communication companies, such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, 
Yahoo, Skype, YouTube, PalTalk, and AOL, as well as telephone companies, such as 
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AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint.5  The NSA collects both content and context information 
and can retain information for an extended period of time. 
Contrasting reports have been presented by government officials and by leaked 
documents about the type and extent of content information collected by PRISM. Content 
information, aside from wiretapped phone calls, is collected via third party 
communications companies.6 Most content data is removed from NSA storage within 
three days. However, if the data matches an identified foreign “target,” it is stored and 
evaluated.7 John Inglis, the former Deputy Director of the NSA, confirmed that the NSA 
does “not target the content of U.S. person’s communications without a specific warrant 
anywhere on the Earth.”8 However, leaked documents posted by The Guardian have 
suggested that the U.S. monitors much more content information than initially believed. 
Documents revealed that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which is 
assumed to abide by the Constitution, authorized the collection of content information 
from communications between individuals in the U.S. and non-citizens without a 
warrant.9 Information collected includes “IP addresses, statements made by the potential 
target, and other information in NSA databases, which can include public information 
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and data collected by other agencies.”10 Because the content data is collected from both 
U.S. citizens and foreigners, the content data obtained from citizens may violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Surveillance is halted if the foreign target is later identified as within 
the U.S., however, data is still initially collected from at least one subject within the U.S., 
which could be ruled in violation of the Fourth Amendment.11 However, insufficient 
evidence proves that the U.S. collects content information from citizens, thus the FISC’s 
authorization of the surveillance program should be trusted. 
The extent of the context data collected by the NSA is much more clear. There are 
few legal restrictions to limit collection of third party context information, particularly 
after the enactment of the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act. Context 
information is stored for a longer period of up to five years in order to identify 
relationships and communication patterns.12 If a target is identified and approval is 
received of an identified “reasonable, articulable suspicion” from a designated official, 
the target’s number is queried in the PRISM database to collect all information associated 
with the number.13 This allows the NSA to track communications over a period of time 
and to identify patterns that may provide information regarding terror threats.14 Although 
the authorization requirement helps to ensure that data is not collected and analyzed 
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without authorization, there have been several instances in which data has been examined 
without authorization and the FISC has sanctioned the NSA.15 In one of the most recent 
compliance issues, an FISC judge found that “the Government had misrepresented the 
scope of its targeting of certain internet communications.”16 Much of the information 
about the NSA’s data collection program remains classified and it is difficult to judge the 
severity of the NSA’s compliance issues, however, many Americans believe the NSA’s 
surveillance invades the right to privacy, and many have questioned the legality and 
constitutionality of the program.  
Court Rulings on the NSA’s Program 
Several court cases have been filed against the NSA’s surveillance program. Prior 
to the Snowden leaks, the ACLU filed a case in response to the FISA Amendments Act 
because of its expansion of the NSA’s ability to obtain information. In ACLU v. Clapper, 
Judge Pauley for the Southern District of New York held that if the precedent in Smith v. 
Maryland stands, then the NSA’s program should be ruled constitutional. In Smith, as 
previously mentioned, law enforcement installed a pen-register to collect context 
information about Smith’s calls. Because the information was voluntarily conveyed to the 
phone company, the Supreme Court ruled that the NSA’s metadata collection was 
constitutional. In Clapper, the petitioners alleged that NSA’s bulk data collection without 
probable cause was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, and 
several statutory provisions. The ACLU argued that the context information collected 
could “reveal a person’s religion, political associations, use of a telephone-sex hotline, 
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contemplation of suicide, addiction to gambling or drugs, experience with rape, grappling 
with sexuality, or support for particular political causes.”17 The NSA’s program could 
endanger essential democratic values. However, the plaintiffs did not have any direct 
evidence of surveillance and the court ruled that the ACLU did not have proper 
standing.18  Nonetheless, the case raised important considerations about the NSA’s data 
collection and the perceptions of data collection by American citizens. 
Although he did not issue a ruling in the case, Judge Pauley discussed the legality 
and constitutionality of the NSA’s surveillance.19 Pauley found that because the NSA 
collects data from telephone and electronic communications companies, rather than 
retrieving communications from personal computers, the information received triggers 
the third party doctrine. As established by Smith and several other third party doctrine 
cases, the government can obtain information from third parties using various legal 
means. Siding with the NSA’s use of the system, Judge Pauley highlights that the NSA 
only receives context information and can only access that information if it meets a 
designated target. The information does not immediately identify any particular 
individual, and only a small fraction of the data collected is analyzed.20 Judge Pauley 
contends that the NSA’s program should be ruled in concurrence with third party doctrine 
cases, because the context information is obtained from third parties with a national 
security letter, which functions as a court order for the information.21 However, ACLU v. 
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Clapper was decided before the Snowden leaks, and more specific details about the 
program may have affected Pauley’s opinion. 
Other judges have interpreted the NSA’s surveillance program in a different 
Fourth Amendment light. In Klayman v. Obama,22 Klayman, like the ACLU, filed a case 
against the NSA for violating the Fourth Amendment. The court decided to address the 
NSA’s metadata collection, rather than collection of content information, because reports 
have not confirmed that the NSA is collecting bulk content information from citizens.23 
Unlike ACLU v. Clapper, Klayman was filed after Snowden’s leaks, thus allowing the 
petitioner to substantively claim the NSA’s metadata collection. A final ruling has not 
been issued in the case and Klayman has petitioned the Supreme Court to address the 
issue, however, Judge Leon issued his opinion of the constitutionality of the NSA’s 
surveillance. 
Unlike Judge Pauley, Judge Leon writes that metadata collection is different from 
the principles presented in Smith, thus Smith should not serve as precedent. Judge Leon 
emphasized that the Smith precedent limited the pen-register search to “short-term, 
forward-looking (as opposed to historical), and highly-limited data collection,” whereas 
the NSA’s surveillance is historical and broad.24 Explaining his ruling, Leon states: 
When do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship 
between the NSA and telecom companies—become to thoroughly unlike 
those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a 
precedent like Smith does not apply? The answer, unfortunately for the 
Government, is now. . . It’s one thing to say that people expect phone 
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quite another to suggest that our citizens expect all phone companies to 
operate what is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering operation with the 
Government.25 
 
The sweeping and historical nature of the NSA’s program is greatly different than any 
case previously considered by the Court, and Leon called on the Supreme Court to 
consider the historical characteristics of the NSA’s program.26 Rather than focused, 
reasonable searches based on probable cause, the NSA’s program seizes nearly every 
electronic communication in the United States. Leon argues that the search and seizure 
plainly violates the Fourth Amendment. 
Is it Constitutional? The Third Party Doctrine and the SCA Applied 
Although the NSA’s surveillance has several distinguishing characteristics in 
comparison to other third party doctrine cases, the underlying principle of each case is 
similar. PRISM collects data from communications companies, such as AT&T and 
Google. It does not collect information directly from citizens’ email boxes or telephones. 
By using communications companies to search and seize information, the government 
does not violate Fourth Amendment precedent. Once information is transmitted to a third 
party for a service, the expectation of privacy in that information is extinguished and 
government agencies or officials can legally request context data without a warrant under 
the Patriot Act. Although it is controversial whether it is reasonable for the government to 
seize bulk context information in the interest of efficiently identifying security threats, 
application of the third party doctrine to the NSA’s surveillance program’s metadata 
collection verifies its constitutionality. As consumers, we surrender complete privacy 
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rights to pieces of information upon communicating them to someone else, and internet 
and phone companies operate as third parties to our communications, thus the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect the information they receive.  
In the normal course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the sweeping and 
historical nature of the NSA’s program may be problematic. However, national security 
needs and specific legislative acts, such as the Patriot Act, have changed the 
characteristics of context data acquisition. Traditional application of the third party 
doctrine requires that government officials obtain a court order to access data. However, 
the Patriot Act changed this component for the NSA’s surveillance program. The Patriot 
Act authorized government to access data in the interest of national security with national 
security letters. These letters act as a court order to access communications information 
from third party companies, thus validating the constitutionality of the bulk data 
collection under the third party doctrine. Constitutional law scholars debate whether the 
third party doctrine and the precedent set in Smith should be applied to the NSA’s 
surveillance program, however, the information is obtained from third parties with a 
specialized court order, thus the context data acquired under the NSA’s program is 
constitutional. As cases against the NSA advance through the court system, however, 
courts will have to decide whether the third party doctrine should apply to the NSA’s data 
collection. If ruled that it does not apply, the courts will need strong explanation to 
support why the NSA’s third party context data collection is beyond the scope of the third 
party doctrine.   
It is likely that the NSA’s metadata collection is not in violation of the third party 
doctrine or the Fourth Amendment. However, the NSA’s collection of content 
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information may pose Fourth Amendment problems. The third party doctrine has 
sometimes been limited to collecting context information, such as the data collected by 
the pen-register in Smith. If the Supreme Court precedents in Smith and Katz are applied 
to the NSA’s collection of electronic communications, content data collection should be 
ruled unconstitutional. However, the third party doctrine has sometimes allowed 
collection of content data, as demonstrated by Miller, in which the content information of 
Miller’s bank account was subpoenaed and ruled constitutional. As private 
communications, however, the NSA’s content collection should follow the precedents in 
Smith and Katz. Although it is unclear how much content data is collected – the NSA has 
denied that it collects content data from citizens and news reports have alleged otherwise 
– any content information collected from citizens without a warrant should be ruled a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The FISA Amendments Act authorized the 
government to collect data from targeted non-citizens, however, content communicated 
within the U.S. should not be obtained.  
Katz v. United States, a previously mentioned case that struck down warrantless 
wiretapping, and Warshak v. United States, a third party doctrine case, can be applied to 
establish protection of content information acquired by the NSA. Although the 
information obtained in Katz was not collected from a third party organization, Katz has 
been applied as a main tenant to restrict law enforcement from obtaining content 
information without a warrant and can be aptly applied to the NSA’s data collection. In 
Katz, Justice Harlan ruled that individuals properly assume the right to privacy in 
personal conversations, such as phone calls and emails, and the Court ruled that it was 
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unlawful to monitor Katz’s phone calls without a warrant.27 Although provisions of the 
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act grant the government more leeway in accessing 
content, citizens still maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in content information, 
and the Fourth Amendment should protect this information.  
In Warshak v. United States, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals at Cincinnati 
applied the third party doctrine and the SCA to evaluate government access to electronic 
communications. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment should protect email 
content and that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in content information.28 
Although the information may be retrieved from a third party, content information can 
reveal intimate details, and it is reasonably assumed that the information will remain 
private and will not be used by third parties. Although the judges in Warshak deferred to 
the “good faith” of the provisions of the SCA that validated warrantless government 
search of email, judges should apply the court’s evaluation of content data collection in 
Warshak to determine the constitutionality of access to content information.29 
Allowing the seizure of content information without a warrant or reasonable 
suspicion could endanger democratic principles and violate the fundamental “right to be 
let alone.” If the government upheld the ability to monitor the content of 
communications, citizens may shy away from expressing beliefs and ideas over the 
internet, especially if those beliefs were controversial. As 86% of Americans have tried to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), in Cornell University Law 
School Legal Information Institute, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347, accessed February 18, 2014. 
28 United States of America v. Steven Warshak et al., 631 F.3d 266, 6th Cir. (2010), in 
USCourts.gov, http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0377p-06.pdf, accessed 
March 20, 2014. 
29 Ibid. 
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increase their anonymity online, the amount of information readily accessible to the 
government is a salient issue that could increasingly affect the use of electronic 
communications if the government were able to collect bulk content information.30 The 
judges in both Katz and Warshak provide an evaluation of content data collection, and 
both cases should be followed to determine the constitutionality of NSA surveillance.  
Although parts of the NSA’s surveillance program are likely constitutional, the 
program plainly violates the SCA’s original provisions. The Patriot Act amended the 
SCA as it applies to the government and authorized more extensive government 
surveillance, only guaranteeing monetary redress if a government actor violates the Act’s 
terms. If the SCA did apply to the NSA’s data collection, it would place limits on the 
ability of the government to obtain information from third party sources and would 
restrict the information that communications companies could voluntarily disclose. The 
Patriot Act and FISA Amendments Act’s provisions are less stringent than those of the 
SCA and allow the government to more easily obtain communications information from 
citizens by using national security letters.  
Other considerations complicate the surveillance program’s constitutionality and 
legality, such as national security and the efficiency of identifying potential terror threats. 
Although the NSA’s data program can be evaluated under the third party doctrine and the 
SCA, as an issue of national security, the controversy is not resolved with simple 
application of these principles. Parts of the NSA’s program may violate traditional 
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Security Online,” Pew Research Internet Project, September 5, 2013, accessed April 14, 
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conceptions of third party jurisprudence, however, special considerations beyond the 
scope of this work complicate the program’s legality and constitutionality. However, 
many Americans have voiced concern over the NSA’s sweeping searches and the danger 
to maintaining the right to privacy in the digital age, and this controversy may trigger the 
need for new standards of privacy and reform of our national security programs in order 
to balance privacy and security needs. 
In January 2014, President Obama gave a speech about plans to reform the NSA’s 
surveillance program and to remove the NSA’s ability to collect bulk data without a 
warrant or court order.31 Obama, however, acknowledged the difficulty in balancing 
privacy rights and security needs. In March 2014, Obama announced legislation to reform 
the NSA’s data program. Obama’s March proposal limits the NSA’s ability to collect 
bulk telecommunication information, and if passed, information could only be obtained 
by issuance of a specialized court order more stringent than a national security letter.32 
Obama requested another 90-day renewal of the current surveillance program while the 
new program reforms are developed.33 Congress has also addressed the issue and has 
begun to develop its own bill for NSA program reform. Regardless of the NSA 
surveillance program’s constitutionality and legality, the public outcry in response to the 
Snowden leaks and the increased concern over the right to privacy in the digital 
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Intelligence,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, January 17, 2014, accessed 
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president-review-signals-intelligence. 
32 Charlie Savage, “Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data Collection,” The New 
York Times, March 24, 2014, accessed April 14, 2014, 
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33 Ibid. 
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revolution should trigger reform to the surveillance program in order to enhance privacy 
rights and protect the democratic freedoms that the right to privacy helps to guarantee. 
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 CHAPTER 4: ADDRESSING PRIVACY CONCERNS GOING FORWARD  
 In Quon, the court stated that email had become “so pervasive that some persons 
may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or necessary [instrument] for self-expression, 
even self-identification.”1 New forms of communication have become commonplace, and 
many of these methods of communication are not strongly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. The third party doctrine and the SCA are helpful in outlining the right to 
privacy; however, current protections are not adequate to preserve privacy in the digital 
age. As demonstrated by the Pew Center’s research discussed earlier in this work, many 
Americans believe that information privacy is valuable, and a large majority of 
Americans have tried to increase their anonymity online.2 Despite personal efforts to 
increase privacy, much of our information transmitted through the internet and through 
phones can be acquired by the government, and often with relatively easy legal means. 
Most Americans are not satisfied with current privacy protections and believe that the 
government should enact new laws to more strongly guard our information.3 It will be 
difficult to appease both extreme-privacy supporters and those who favor enhanced law 
enforcement, nevertheless, the current system warrants reform to more equally balance 
these two areas. 
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With the amount of information transmitted to third parties, it may be 
unreasonable to expect that our data will remain truly secret; however, we can expect 
more privacy than is currently guaranteed. Third parties must process much of the 
information we convey, such as phone numbers and email addresses. However, increased 
concern over privacy in the digital age demands that our laws and doctrines are amended 
to accommodate privacy concerns. The large proportion of Americans who have tried to 
increase their anonymity online illustrates the fear of the ease at which personal 
information is collected in the digital age. Weak privacy protections may pressure 
Americans to censor their communications and online activity. Fear of expressing oneself 
is contrary to fundamental American principles, and our laws should accommodate the 
right to privacy in order to preserve these principles. However, there is also value in the 
ability of law enforcement to efficiently and effectively collect information to identify 
crime. Allowing law enforcement to obtain communication information conveyed over 
phones and on the internet helps to efficiently collect evidence, and in the case of national 
security, to identify potential terror threats. Both the right to privacy and the needs of law 
enforcement are important issues, and the SCA and the third party doctrine are necessary 
to help strike a balance between these needs. Current conceptions of the third party 
doctrine and the SCA, however, do not provide enough information protection.  
Both the SCA and the third party doctrine provide bright-line rules to determine 
the privacy of our communications. This helps to promote efficiency in law enforcement 
and clarity in applying the rules. However, both the SCA and the third party doctrine 
should be altered to provide further clarity in application, as well as to define the specific 
instances in which we can expect our information to retain Fourth Amendment 
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protections. Alternatives to the third party doctrine, such as the proportionality principle 
discussed in Chapter 2, would be difficult to apply and would rely heavily on discretion 
of law enforcement and judges. Amended versions of the third party doctrine and the 
SCA would provide a sound balance between law enforcement’s ability to obtain 
information and to guarantee the right to privacy. To provide clarity and appropriate data 
privacy protections, the following clarifications and amendments should be made to the 
third party doctrine and the SCA: 1) third party doctrine should only apply to context 
data, 2) content data should be protected by the Fourth Amendment, 3) the SCA should 
eliminate the distinction between RCS and ECS communications, and 4) the SCA should 
require warrants for all content data acquisition. 
The Third Party Doctrine’s Application to Electronic Communications 
 The third party doctrine has been established in our court system to determine the 
ability of law enforcement to access information revealed to a third party. The doctrine’s 
application to electronic communications is controversial; however, it provides a bright-
line rule to promote efficient law enforcement, while also offering necessary protections 
to personal information. To provide further clarity and protection going forward, the third 
party doctrine should be tailored to fit privacy needs that have developed with the digital 
revolution. To do so, context information should be governed under the third party 
doctrine, and content information should retain Fourth Amendment protection. Although 
the third party doctrine has previously covered some content information, such as verbal 
conversations to an undercover agent, electronic content information should not fall 
under the third party doctrine. This principle will help to strike a healthier balance 
between the needs of law enforcement and individual privacy needs.  
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The third party doctrine is necessary to define the privacy of information 
conveyed to third parties. However, electronic communications present a more 
complicated privacy dilemma, and the third party doctrine should be amended in its 
application to new methods of communication. Most communications today involve third 
parties, which would traditionally call for application of the third party doctrine. 
However, there are no practical alternatives to electronic communications; courts cannot 
presume that if an individual wanted privacy in communications that she or he would use 
another means of communicating that information. Our modes of communication should 
not automatically forfeit the expectation to privacy in that information.  In general, it is 
reasonable to expect privacy in content material. Privacy ensures the ability to freely 
express oneself without fear of government search and seizure, and the Framers 
attempted to guard against warrantless invasions of privacy when developing the Fourth 
Amendment. Context information, however, is voluntarily delivered to third parties for 
use of that information, and so it may be less reasonable to expect privacy in this 
information.  
The third party doctrine should apply to context information, while content 
information should retain Fourth Amendment protections. Ex parte Jackson and Warshak 
v. United States provide prior court guidelines to help ensure content information 
protection. As discussed previously, Ex parte Jackson established the privacy of mailed 
letters. Similarly, although the constitutional arguments were not ultimately addressed, 
the court in Warshak declared that citizens hold a reasonable expectation to privacy in 
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email content.4 Although content information may be incidentally communicated to a 
third party for a service, the individual usually presumes privacy in that information, just 
as someone would presume privacy in the contents of a mailed letter. Katz provides an 
example in which the Supreme Court declared that that simply because information, such 
as a telephone call, is accessible by a third party, Fourth Amendment rights or the 
reasonable expectation to privacy in that information is not automatically extinguished. 
Although our means of communication have changed, use of electronic communications 
does not forfeit our right to privacy. Only if, for example, an individual made a phone 
call in public or if an email was projected on a public screen should the third party 
doctrine apply. Otherwise, the Fourth Amendment should govern content information 
conveyed to third parties for a communication service. Including content information 
under the Fourth Amendment ensures that the government cannot obtain revealing 
content information with a court order or subpoena and instead must show probable cause 
in order to search and seize data.  
Although content information should fall under the Fourth Amendment, context 
information should follow third party doctrine jurisprudence. Context information is 
voluntarily revealed to a third party to use that information. Similar to a mailing address 
on an envelope, context information is revealed to an electronic communications 
company or servers to facilitate a service. Although privacy policies and the SCA limit 
the ability of third parties to disseminate information to others, allowing the government 
to collect some information serves a legitimate and compelling government interest. 	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Context information can aid efficiency of the law enforcement system. Furthermore, the 
law requires a subpoena or court order before information can be accessed, thus helping 
to protect against arbitrary data collection and ensuring that information cannot be 
willingly forfeited to the government. As information communicated to a third party to 
use that information, context information should be governed by the third party doctrine. 
Distinguishing between content and context information helps to provide clarity 
to the application of the Fourth Amendment to electronic communications, however, the 
line between content and context information is blurred in some cases. Whereas email 
messages and addresses are more simply separated into content and context data, the 
issue becomes convoluted when considering online activity. IP addresses, which are 
computer-identifying strings of code, have traditionally been considered context 
information and are accessible by court order or subpoena under the provisions of the Pen 
Register Act, which is the third section of the ECPA.5 IP addresses are communicated 
across networks when websites are visited, and because they are recorded by individual 
websites, IP addresses can be just as revealing as content information protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. The government could conceivably collect each website an 
individual has visited, which could reveal a great amount of information about the 
targeted individual, such as her religion or political beliefs. Although this information can 
be just as revealing as content information, because the information is voluntarily relayed 
to a third party as a means of facilitating a service, the information should be ruled as 
context information and thus should not be protected under the Fourth Amendment. The 
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courts may face the difficulty of this issue in the next few years as the NSA’s internet 
information collection program is challenged. 
A Necessary Tool in Our Legal System 
The third party doctrine serves a compelling government interest, because it 
allows law enforcement to efficiently gather evidence to a crime, whereas information 
protected by the Fourth Amendment may be more difficult to obtain. Because context 
information is relayed to third parties to use that information for a specific service, the 
third party doctrine should apply to this information. Content information, on the other 
hand, is reasonably expected as private information. The digital age has complicated the 
third party doctrine’s application, however, fundamental principles of information 
privacy, as demonstrated in cases such as Ex parte Jackson, should be applied to new 
methods of communication in order to guarantee Fourth Amendment protection to 
content information. 
The third party doctrine provides clarity to law enforcement and the courts in 
determining the privacy rights of information conveyed electronically. Because most of 
our communications are revealed to third parties today, the third party doctrine helps to 
distinguish which information falls under the Fourth Amendment, thus helping to clarify 
privacy rights and helping to facilitate law enforcement’s ability to collect information 
from third parties. Although this understanding of the third party doctrine may not 
guarantee privacy to all of our information, and it does not allow law enforcement to 
easily access all data, the third party doctrine helps to define our privacy rights and 
facilitate effective and efficient law enforcement. 
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Amendments to the SCA 
 Similar to the third party doctrine, the SCA has several faults that should be 
amended to reconcile with the enormous amount of data transmitted through phones and 
the internet each day. The SCA provides appropriate groundwork to outline privacy 
protections in the digital age, however, the statute should be updated in order to provide 
clarity in application and to ensure privacy protections for content and context data. 
Many courts have had difficulty in applying the SCA consistently.6 In some cases, judges 
have misconstrued the statute to apply to web browser cookies, which are not addressed 
in the SCA.7 While many of the SCA’s provisions are still surprisingly relevant after 
nearly thirty years, several aspects of the statute’s language complicate its application to 
current technology. Updating the SCA’s provisions to more applicably address the 
situations in which our information can be accessed without a warrant will give clarity to 
law enforcement and the courts, as well as to citizens to define when to expect 
information privacy and when information can be accessed by court order or subpoena.  
As mentioned previously and as outlined by Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz 
and by the Court in Ex parte Jackson, Americans usually have an expectation to privacy 
in content material. It is usually assumed that the content of emails, video calls on the 
internet, phone conversations, and text messages are private. The content of 
communication – in most cases – is not conveyed to the public or to a third party for use 
of that information, thus individuals retain a reasonable expectation to privacy in that 
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information. The SCA allows law enforcement to obtain content data from third party 
organizations if the message is unopened and 180 days old or opened and stored. Content 
data only retains its Fourth Amendment protections when it is less than 180 days old and 
unopened. This distinction is no longer relevant in current terms – it is common store to 
old emails on accounts for long periods of time and cloud storage services, such as 
Google Drive, offer long-term file storage. Under the current SCA, very few emails in 
our inboxes, for example, require a warrant for law enforcement to obtain. Instead, the 
court’s logic in Warshak should be upheld and the SCA should not allow warrantless 
searches of content material.8 Much like the distinction discussed in the prior section, 
Congress should amend the SCA to require warrants for content information, while 
keeping context information under the current rules of the SCA.  
Aligning the distinctions of the third party doctrine with the SCA will help to 
provide clarity for courts and for law enforcement in applying the SCA. The 
complications of applying the SCA are demonstrated by Warshak, in which the court 
ruled that the “good faith” provisions of the SCA should prevail, but that the government 
violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights by accessing his email messages. 
Amending the SCA to distinguish between content and context information will remove 
the discrepancy between Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the provisions of the 
SCA. 
Aside from amending the SCA’s application to content information, the Act’s 
irrelevant distinction between RCS and ECS communications should be eliminated, thus 
implementing one standard for content and context communication. This bright-line rule 	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would ensure more streamlined application by law enforcement and clarity for courts 
evaluating SCA cases. As previously mentioned, Congress wrote the SCA in a time 
period before email accounts stored large amounts of messages and before large amounts 
of information were stored and communicated through third parties. It is much more 
common for individuals to keep emails long term, thus the SCA should not distinguish 
stored communications based on the amount of time the individual has possessed them 
and should not allot different levels of privacy for unopened or stored emails. Our right to 
privacy in content information should not hinge on the age of a message, and the 
expectation to privacy should be maintained with the development new technologies that 
facilitate long term storage of electronic communications.   
Protecting content information helps to better protect intimate details. That is not 
to say that context information cannot reveal important details about an individual, such 
as the dilemma regarding IP addresses mentioned in the previous section, but by strictly 
limiting access to content and allowing easier legal means to obtain context information, 
a more harmonious balance between privacy rights and the needs of the government to 
ensure national security can be reached. If necessary, the government can still obtain 
content with a warrant or by providing cause to an impending threat to national security. 
In addition, these amendments to the SCA will help to govern the instances in which third 
parties themselves can disseminate information the government, thus further protecting 
against unlawful access to third party information. The SCA provides important 
guidelines, however, it should be amended to provide stronger protections to content 
information and to appropriately address updated use of third parties for content 
information storage. 
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The four recommendations outlined in this section will help to align our laws and 
institutions with the right to privacy. The current system sways toward government 
acquisition of personal communications data, and while it is important to facilitate 
efficient and effective law enforcement, privacy rights are necessary to maintain some of 
our most prized democratic ideals. Both traditional searches of communications data and 
the NSA’s surveillance program are currently too far reaching; our laws and court 
jurisprudence require changes to protect our right to privacy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The balance between privacy, technology, and the needs of law enforcement are 
complicated. As demonstrated by the NSA’s surveillance program and the public outcry 
in response to the Snowden leaks, our personal privacy is an important issue that warrants 
discussion. The Framers wanted to protect against unwarranted searches and seizures into 
private areas, and the ease at which the government can access content information is a 
threat to the fundamental rights that the Framers sought to protect. Electronic 
communications content information can reveal a great deal of information about an 
individual, including controversial information such as religious beliefs, medical 
information, political preferences, and sexuality. Allowing warrantless government 
access to this kind of information endangers democratic freedoms and violates 
constitutional principles.  
 Our institutions and the minds of our citizens have not developed “hand in hand” 
while technology has revolutionized our world, as Thomas Jefferson argued that they 
should. The great controversy regarding individual privacy in the digital age suggests that 
our institutions and expectations are out of step and require reform in order to ensure a 
just society. It is unlikely that we will strike a true balance between information privacy 
and the ability for law enforcement to collect data. Even with updated laws and court 
doctrines, there will likely be a discrepancy between privacy and the government’s ability 
to collect data. Nonetheless, the current system demands updated laws and doctrines to 
govern our information privacy in the twenty-first century. The Constitution does not 
guarantee a right to privacy, but statutory law and some of our most prominent 
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constitutional scholars have discussed the necessity of preserving privacy in reasonable 
situations.  
The issue will not likely be resolved soon, however, as acknowledged recently by 
Obama and by many American citizens, the current NSA program may extend beyond 
the acceptable means of data collection. Matters of national security demand 
consideration of extenuating factors compelling to the safety of our nation, however, 
many citizens and organizations have filed suit against the NSA. Despite suggestions for 
the Supreme Court to take up the issue, many have expressed that the Supreme Court 
may not be a suitable institution to decide a matter involving national security. 
Addressing the NSA cases petitioned to the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia stated, 
“[w]e know nothing about the degree of the risk. The executive knows. The Congress 
knows. We don’t know anything, and we’re going to be the one to decide that question?”1 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has suggested that they intend to rely on the FISC to 
monitor the constitutionality of the NSA’s program.2 
On the other hand, if Congress decides the issue, they may continue to sway 
toward allowing easier government access to communications data. Congress is likely to 
favor enhanced national security over personal privacy. However, if the current 
program’s problems are not adequately resolved by the Obama administration and 
Congress in the coming months as they have suggested, the Supreme Court may have to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Trevor Eischen, “Ginsburg, Scalia discuss NSA, freedoms,” Politico, last modified 
April 17, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/supreme-court-ruth-bader-ginsburg-antonin-
scalia-105807.html. 
2 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (2013), in Cornell University Law 
School Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/11-1025, 
accessed April 20, 2014. 
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step in to prevent invasions of privacy, particularly if leaked information confirms the 
government’s surveillance of content information.  
Regardless of which branch resolves our present privacy problems, the current 
balance between serving the government interest and the reasonable expectation to 
privacy in communications is skewed, both in regard to the NSA’s program and in 
regular application of the third party doctrine and the SCA to electronic communications. 
The SCA and the third party doctrine favor the government’s ability to obtain 
information, and to achieve a more sound balance, both the SCA and the third party 
doctrine should distinguish between content and context information, thus ensuring 
Fourth Amendment protections to content information and keeping context information 
under the third party doctrine and the current rules of the SCA. Our right to privacy is 
critical in maintaining democracy, and the Jeffersonian vision that “[l]aws and 
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind” challenges us to 
advance privacy protection in the digital age. 
